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I. INTRODUCTION
What drives the choice of European law as a field of study and
scholarship? For many, the answer rests in the puzzle of the
emergence of a powerful rule of law in a political system that, for all
intents and purposes, began in the anarchical international sphere.1
Through the constitutionalization of the founding treaties, the politics
of state power and national interest have been replaced by the rulebound behavior and the equality, predictability, and stability of a
conventional legal system. In other words, in the eyes of many, the
European legal system has left behind the shortcomings of public
international law—most importantly the suspicion that international
law is not really law at all because the rules are the product of state
power and mutual interest and, once they no longer serve such ends,
can be broken with impunity—and has adopted the civilizing

* Professor, George Washington University Law School.
1. See generally Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a
Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981) (delivering the classic
account of the development of European constitutional law).
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principles of law in what approximates a federal legal order.2 As this
characterization suggests, at least part of the attraction of European
law rests in the fact that constitutionalization presents an empirical
puzzle with a strong moral dimension.
While constitutionalization has been at the heart of scholarship in
law and political science for decades, it has only recently captured
the attention of legal historians. With their distinct methods and
sources, they have already contributed in fundamental ways to our
understanding of the constitutional paradigm, and given the highly
ambitious research programs of Morten Rasmussen, Bill Davies, and
others, they will undoubtedly continue to do so. In this essay, I
review some of their claims and findings from the perspective of the
legal discipline. In Part II, I argue that historical research has
uncovered a legal dimension of the constitutionalization process that
has been missing from the dominant account and that implicitly
draws on and sheds light upon concepts and theories that are central
to the field of comparative law. In contrast with the conventional
account in both the law and political science, which contains a fairly
thin rendition of the legal process centered on a supranational court
(the Court of Justice) interpreting a single supranational text (the
Treaty of Rome), legal historians have documented the variety of
legal actors and the multiplicity of domestic legal sources that
combined, through a process of legal transplants, to fashion the
supranational constitutional apparatus.3 Pluralism and cross-national
2. See generally Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement
in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 261−70 (2011) (providing
an overview of the skepticism associated with international law).
3. See generally Stein, supra note 1 (analyzing the constitutional doctrines
developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities under the Treaty);
Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The European Court and the National
Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 66,
66 (1998) (postulating that European legal integration is the result of connections
made between the European Court of Justice, national courts, and private litigants);
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413−19
(1991) (noting that the “constitutionalization” of the European Community’s legal
structure grew from the establishment of four doctrines by the European Court of
Justice: the doctrine of direct effect, whereby Community law has direct effect in
domestic legal systems; the doctrine of supremacy, whereby Community law
“trumps” national law where the two conflict; the doctrine of implied powers,
which provides the Community with powers to carry out the tasks given to it under
the European Economic Community Treaty; and the doctrine of human rights,
which establishes that the Court will review Community measures to ensure they
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variation in the types of professionals and institutions responsible for
crafting the law, as well as the migration of legal concepts between
jurisdictions, are central themes in the field of comparative law, and
historical research has revealed the importance of understanding such
variation and transplantation in the relatively understudied domain of
public and supranational law.
In Part III, I argue that the lessons that are sometimes drawn by
legal historians for contemporary normative and philosophical
debates on the nature of the European constitutional order are less
persuasive. It is sometimes argued that, since the process that led to
the rise of what is alternatively called the “constitutional narrative”
or “constitutional practice” was more contested and contingent than
is normally believed to be the case, the existence, today, of a quasifederal constitutional order is questionable. To simplify somewhat,
the claim is that constitutionalization is a story told by a small cadre
of starry-eyed and ideologically motivated lawyers and that it does
not reflect the current realities of the member states, which continue
to privilege national over European law and to give effect to
European law only sporadically.4 Although there is some support for
this view, I argue that there is significant countervailing evidence
and that the constitutional paradigm therefore remains a useful
framework for conceptualizing European law.

II. EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY AND
COMPARATIVE LAW
In the conventional account of how the doctrinal apparatus and the
routine practice of the European constitutional order came to be
established, the legal dimension, namely the institutions, actors,
sources, and methods that combined to produce the law, is quite thin.
As Morten Rasmussen narrates in far greater detail, the early legal
scholarship explained constitutionalization as an authoritative
process by which the European Court of Justice used the teleological
method of interpretation to derive direct effect, supremacy, and a
host of other important doctrines from the text of the Treaty.5 The
are consonant with fundamental human rights).
4. Morten Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law: The
New Contribution of Historians, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1187 (2013).
5. Id. (providing a historical overview of legal scholarship on European law
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principal legal actor was the Court, the main source of law was the
written law of the Treaty, and the dominant interpretive technique
was the teleological method. The political science scholarship that
followed beginning in the early 1990s called attention to the
shortcomings of this legal explanation of constitutionalization—most
importantly the radical nature and disputed authority of the Court’s
judgments—and put forward a variety of other factors to explain the
emergence of the European legal system, including the material
incentives of market actors and the judiciary’s institutional quest for
greater power, both the Court of Justice and those national courts that
allied themselves with the Court of Justice.6 Their contribution was
to enrich the legal account by including a series of actors—interest
groups and economic actors—and incentives—institutional power
and material advancement—external to the profession, reasoning,
and rule-bound behavior of the law. The law and the process of
fabricating the law, however, remained the same as in the earlier
scholarship.
The recent historical research, by contrast, has expanded our
understanding of the internal legal dynamics that gave rise to
constitutionalization in two important ways. First, it has revealed a
much broader network of legal professionals and legal institutions
and explaining that early scholarship focused primarily on the contributions of the
ECJ in interpreting the Treaty, by way of the direct effect and supremacy
doctrines).
6. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001) (explaining that
mutual interest in “European integration, self-empowerment, greater efficiency, or
the rule of law” motivated national governments to compromise sovereignty in
favor of a European legal system); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe
Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 43
(1993) (adopting a neofunctionalist view of European Community integration, with
legal integration as the dependent variable, and the self-interested actions of
European Community institutions, state governments, and private actors as the
independent variables); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a
Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European
Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 63 (1998) (arguing for a theory of
European legal integration that incorporates, “as interdependent causal factors,
contracting among individuals, third-party dispute resolution, and the production
of legal norms”); J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of
Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 512, 532−33 (1994)
(postulating that acceptance of the constitutional order imposed by the European
Court of Justice amounted to a “quiet revolution” and arguing that judicial
empowerment was one reason for this acceptance).
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involved in shaping the emerging constitutional order, which extends
well beyond the judges on the European Court of Justice and
collaborating national courts. Second, it has demonstrated that the
domestic law of the member states served as a crucial springboard
for the new law of the European Community, influencing a number
of key features of the supranational legal order.
On the first point, recent historical research has shown the
importance of three groups of legal elites that have been ignored in
the prevailing account of constitutionalization: executive branch
lawyers, legal scholars, and the organized bar. At the supranational
level, Morten Rasmussen documents in fascinating detail how the
Commission’s Legal Service (the legal division of the European
executive branch) promoted an ambitious, federal vision of European
law with the teleological method of interpretation and how it
ultimately persuaded the Court of Justice, with a few caveats, to
adopt this approach.7 Rasmussen, together with others, has also
chronicled the Legal Service’s efforts to sponsor a pro-integration
bar and legal academy capable of diffusing and litigating European
law through its financial and organizational support for national
professional associations and specialized legal journals.8 As they
demonstrate, a number of the seminal cases decided by the Court of
7. See Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of
European Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive
1952−65, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 375 (2012).
8. See id. at 383−84 (explaining that the “professional and academic
infrastructure . . . had been so sorely missing in the 1950s”); see also Antoine
Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization: Van Gend en Loos and the
Making of the EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1, 9−10 (2010) (documenting the Legal
Service’s support of the Fédération internationale pour le droit européen (FIDE),
the pan-European lawyers’ association, particularly in analyzing which provisions
of the European treaties were self-executing); Antoine Vauchez, The Making of the
European Union’s Constitutional Foundations: The Brokering Role of Legal
Entrepreneurs and Networks, in TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: GOVERNING EUROPE 1945-83, 108, 115−16 (Wolfram Kaiser et al.
eds., 2010) (remarking that, while there is no direct evidence to suggest that the
Legal Service created FIDE, Legal Service officials were active within it,
ultimately fostering a legal network “located at the crossroads between the national
and the European levels as much as in-between the various legal, political,
economic and administrative sites of the EC polity”); Antonin Cohen,
Constitutionalism Without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Political
Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for Europe
(1940s−1960s), 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 109 (2007) (providing an overview of the
evolving role of legal professionals and elites in European legal integration).
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Justice in the 1960s were brought by members of the Dutch
European law association, and afterwards the judgments of the Court
were disseminated and publicized through the publication of
translations, case commentaries, and articles in the newly established
specialized law journals.9 Thus, at the supranational level, the
impetus for some of the most important constitutional developments
came not from the Court but executive branch lawyers, the organized
bar, and the legal academy.
In Germany, Bill Davies demonstrates that a different
constellation of legal elites and institutions was active in resisting
and ultimately, through the jurisprudence of rights, shaping European
law.10 There, legal academics were the first to underline the failure of
the European legal system to guarantee fundamental rights in line
with the German Basic Law and to voice their opposition to legal
integration based on the constitutional failures of supranational
governance. This position was then espoused by the courts, most
importantly, the Constitutional Court in the Solange case, and
induced the Commission, Council, and Parliament to issue a joint
political declaration in favor of rights, as well as to a marked change
in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.11 Although German
executive branch lawyers, both in the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were active in European affairs, they
carried relatively little weight in the fundamental rights saga. Initially
exponents of the pro-integration position of the German government,
they mobilized in favor of rights only once the Constitutional Court
had ruled and it was necessary to find a political comprise to
9. See, e.g., Vauchez, supra note 8, at 11−15 (explaining that, despite the “not
irrelevant variations” in translations, the commentaries and the publication of
articles by legal elites and parties involved in the case “turned the ambiguous Van
Gend en Loos into a clear-cut and far-reaching judicial fiat”).
10. See BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST
GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949−1979, 78−88 (2012)
(describing the role of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (“FCC”) and
legal academia in critiquing and arguing rulings and procedural decisions made by
the FCC and the European Court of Justice “as to the relationship between national
constitutional law and the European legal system”).
11. Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May
29, 1974, INTERNATIONALE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange I), 37 BVerfGE 271
(Ger.); Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct.
22, 1986, WÜNSCHE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange II), 73 BVerfGE 339
(Ger.).
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guarantee the cooperation of the German judicial branch.
France presents yet a different picture. Although there is still
research to be done, Alexandre Bernier has examined the role of the
French European law association in the larger context of the legal
establishment.12 He demonstrates that the pro-integration lawyers and
academics who banded together in the European law association
exerted very little influence and that instead the executive branch,
under the fiercely sovereigntist General De Gaulle, was able to
control the courts and preserve the largely national bent of French
law.13 The French courts, lacking the same independence from the
government and the administration as existed in other member states,
failed to ally themselves with the Court of Justice in promoting and
applying European law as courts did elsewhere. Thus, at least in this
preliminary account and in contrast with Germany, legal academics
and members of the judiciary played a relatively inconsequential role
in determining the French attitude toward European law; instead, the
decisive player was the executive branch.
In exploring the wide range of legal elites involved in the
constitutionalization process, together with the considerable variation
that separated countries like France and Germany, legal historians
have tapped into an important element of legal systems at the heart of
the research agenda of comparative law. One of the guiding
principles of comparative law is that knowledge of a foreign system
cannot be gained solely by learning the legal rules and principles that
govern different classes of disputes.14 Not only is the quantity and
frequency of change of specific rules and principles such that this
form of knowledge is incomplete and quickly becomes obsolete, but
12. See Alexandre Bernier, Constructing and Legitimating Transnational Jurist
Networks and the Making of a Constitutional Practice of European Law,
1950−1970, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 399, 407−14 (2012) (arguing that, although the
French Association des juristes européens (AJE) succeeded in introducing
European law to France, it had limited impact in promoting acceptance of
European law in France due to political and legal constraints, including the
Euroskeptic Gaullist French administration of the 1960s).
13. Id.
14. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law (Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 21 (1991) (noting that most legal
systems do not actually have one “legal rule” to govern each type of dispute and
that comparative legal scholars must therefore look more broadly at the rule as
stated in a statute or the constitution, the rule as interpreted by legal scholars, and
the rule as enforced by courts).
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their meaning differs radically depending on the legal sources,
institutions, and the legal professionals that hold sway in the foreign
system. A considerable portion, if not the bulk, of scholarship in
comparative law has been dedicated to uncovering these more
fundamental and persistent differences, and even though this work
has been criticized for oversimplifying legal traditions, it continues
to inform teaching and research on the world’s legal systems.15 Thus
the common wisdom is that the primary source of law in civil law
jurisdictions is written codes and in common law systems, judgemade precedent, and that modes of reasoning from these two types of
sources range from the inductive reasoning of the common law, the
conceptualist approach of the German and Italian systems,
parsimonious deduction from the code in France, and the pragmatic
approach of Scandinavian legal systems.16 More to the point of the
new historical research on European law, comparative law has
sought to understand foreign legal systems by uncovering differences
in the organization and status of the legal professionals called upon
to interpret and develop the rules. In some systems, like the English
common law, the judge occupies pride of place, while in other
systems, like the German and Italian civil law, the key protagonist is

15. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY 17−29 (2d ed., 1998) (reviewing the “three principal families of
law existing in the contemporary world,” the Romano-Germanic, common law,
and socialist legal systems, in addition to “other systems,” including the Muslim,
Hindu, Jewish, Far East, and Sub-Saharan Africa legal families). See generally
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed.,
1998) (discussing the aims, methods, functions, and history of comparative law;
surveying the Roman, Germanic, Anglo-American, Nordic, socialist, and “other”
legal families; and applying comparative law principles to private legal
institutions); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed., 1985)
(providing an overview of the civil legal systems of Western Europe, Latin
America, and parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East); JOHN P. DAWSON, THE
ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968) (analyzing the role of case law in shaping the legal
systems of England, Rome, France, and Germany through examination of the
relationships between judges and political rulers, the nature and frequency of social
change, the importance of other legal spokespersons, and the methods for training
lawyers, in addition to the judgments themselves).
16. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 15, at 63−339 (grouping the different styles
of legal systems into six categories of legal families: Romanistic (France & Italy);
Germanic (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland); Anglo-American (England and
United States); Nordic (Scandinavia); socialist; and “other” (Far Eastern, Islamic,
and Hindu law)).
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the law professor.17
Historical research on European law complements this line of
comparative research on the institutions and elites that wield the
authority to give meaning to the law in different legal systems by
shifting the focus from private to public law. For reasons that have
been thoroughly rehearsed elsewhere, comparative law has
traditionally been almost exclusively preoccupied with private law—
the law of contracts, torts, property, and so on that governs disputes
between private parties—and not public law—the law that applies to
disputes between individuals and state actors such as legislatures and
government administration.18 The European Community law of the
1950s and 1960s, in contrast with the conventional focus of
comparative law, consisted almost entirely of legal guarantees
designed to curb protectionist state policies and to regulate the
market in agricultural commodities. Thus, by necessity, the new
historical research has focused on the legal elites and institutions
involved in public, not private, law and, in doing so, has improved
our broader understanding of European legal systems. So far, one of
the principal contributions has been to illuminate the role of
government lawyers who, through internal administrative circulars
and government litigation, had an important part to play in crafting
the law in the public domain. Taken together, the research discussed
earlier shows that these government lawyers and civil servants were
highly influential at the supranational level, and, it appears, in
France, but less so in Germany. Another lesson that can be drawn
from the cases explored by Rasmussen, Davies, and others is that
some of the characteristic differences of private law carry over into
public law, in particular the towering presence of the legal academy
in the German system, in contrast with what appears to have been a
less important role in France and the Netherlands.

17. DAWSON, supra note 15, at xii−xiii.
18. See John Bell, Comparative Public Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE
21ST CENTURY 235 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örucu eds., 2002) (providing a
framework for comparative public law and remarking that “public law has a
number of institutional features that make it a significantly different activity
compared with private law”); Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of
Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
671, 680 (2002) (noting that comparative law is often criticized for, among other
reasons, its “obsession with private law”).

1320

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[28:5

In addition to providing a more complex account of the legal
actors involved in constitutionalization, historical research has laid
bare an important source of law that fueled and shaped the new
constitutional order and that has, until recently, received relatively
little attention in the scholarly debates—the domestic law of the
member states. As explained above, according to the early legal
scholarship and political science research, the principal source that
served to establish the legal authority of the emerging constitutional
order was the text of the Treaty and interpretation of that text through
the teleological method.19 Recent historical research, however, has
shown that members of the legal establishment, both at the national
and supranational levels, drew not only on public international law,
i.e. a treaty between sovereign states, but upon domestic sources of
law to inspire their constitutional innovations. In exploring the
origins of some of the key provisions on the design of the Court of
Justice contained in the Treaty of Paris, and then the Treaty of Rome,
Anne Boerger-de Smedt has shown that the drafters cut and pasted
elements of French administrative law and German constitutional
law in designing the heads of review, while they relied on Italian
constitutional law in creating the preliminary reference system.20
Karin van Leeuven documents the importance of Dutch
constitutional reforms that firmly established the Netherlands as a
monist system of international law for fueling the critical early
litigation before the Court of Justice, and I have argued elsewhere
that these monist concepts shaped the supranational doctrines of
direct effect and supremacy.21 In his analysis of the German
19. Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1205−06.
20. Anne Boerger-de Smedt, La Cour de Justice dans les négociations du traité
de Paris instituant la CECA, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 7 (2008) [hereinafter
Boerger-de Smedt, La Cour de Justice]; Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the
Foundations of European Law, 1950-57: The Legal History of the Treaties of
Paris and Rome, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 339, 346, 352 (2012) [hereinafter Boergerde Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations] (noting the impact of Magistrate Maurice
Lagrange, who used his French administrative law background to influence the
determination of the Court’s duties).
21. Karin van Leeuwen, On Democratic Concerns and Legal Traditions: The
Dutch 1953 and 1956 Constitutional Reforms “Towards” Europe, 21 CONT. EUR.
HIST. 357, 358 (2012) (demonstrating how Dutch constitutional reforms were
instrumental in the development of European constitutional law because they
established the primacy of international treaties and jurisprudence over national
law, which ultimately paved the way for several Dutch preliminary references to
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experience, Bill Davies shows in greater detail and far more
persuasively than the earlier literature that the decision to incorporate
fundamental rights, as well as the catalogue of such rights, was
driven by the allegiance of German elites to their constitutional
guarantees of fundamental rights.22 As Rasmussen puts it: “[historical
research] has begun to explore how the national constitutional
systems and legal cultures provided a constitutive framework—a
fixed variety of options—for the development of European public
law.”23
This dimension of the new historical research contributes to yet
another strand of comparative law scholarship, namely the study of
legal transplants. The migration of law between jurisdictions has
been a constant in legal history and is a pivotal theme in comparative
scholarship, so much so that Alan Watson, in his seminal writing
from the 1970s, calls it the only topic deserving of comparative
research.24 In history, classic examples are the spread of the Civil
Code on the French or German mold to Latin American, African, and
Asian legal systems and the piecemeal incorporation of Roman law
rules on matters such as divorce and the transfer of real property into
both common and civil law systems.25 Comparative law has sought to
demonstrate that legal systems are not hermetically sealed and selfthe European Court of Justice, including the Van Gend en Loos case); Francesca
Bignami, Comparative Law and the Rise of the European Court of Justice (Mar. 3,
2011) (unpublished paper for the biennial meeting of the European Union Studies
Association) (on file with author).
22. DAVIES, supra note 10.
23. Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1218.
24. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 9 (1974) (arguing that “boundaries of Comparative Law have been drawn too
widely, and that they should define an area akin to that of comparative linguistics;
that is, they should be concerned with similarities and differences in the context of
a historical relationship”).
25. See Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441, 445−51
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (documenting the
diffusion, often by force, of Roman law and the civil codes of France, Germany,
and Switzerland in Europe and the rest of the world); see also WATSON, supra note
24, at 22 (“The excerpts from the Civil Code of Spain showing basic contract rules
equally valid in France, Chile, Columbia, Germany, Holland, Italy, Mexico,
Portugal, and many other lands, and equally honored across eighteen or more
centuries, offer a substantial challenge to the view that law reflects all the changes
of changing economies and all the diversities of diverse civilizations.”).
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contained and that, in addition to formally recognized sources of law,
such as constitutions, statutes, and judicial precedent, it is necessary
to include foreign law as a major and constant source of legal
decisionmaking.
The literature on transplants, in addition to documenting the extent
of the phenomenon, has tackled two distinct questions: what explains
the decision to borrow from another jurisdiction and, once a rule or
collection of rules has been borrowed, what impact does the
transplant have on the new legal system? The latter question has
triggered a ferocious debate on the possibility, as well as the
desirability, of borrowing. Some are of the opinion that transplants
can never operate as intended and that the integrity of national
systems should be defended against foreign imports,26 while others
take a more sanguine view of what is seen to be an inevitable and
creative mode of lawmaking and dispute resolution.27 Yet others
assume the middle position that the success of transplants depends on
whether the local circumstances exist in which foreign rules are
likely to be fully understood and mobilized.28 On the first question
concerning the causes of transplants, at least three pathways to legal
transplants have been identified in the literature: imposition through
military conquest or other forms of foreign domination; a relatively
insular process, shielded from politics, of borrowing by legal
26. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 MAASTRICHT
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 122 (1997) (arguing that the theory that law can be
transplanted or borrowed merely “reflects a faith in abstract universalism which is
at odds with the observable decline of formal rationality and the correlative
materialization of formal law characterized by the increasing prevalence of
informative arguments of a sociological, economic, political, historical, cultural,
epistemological or ethical, rather than conceptual nature”).
27. See WATSON, supra note 24, at 21 (remarking that legal transplants have
been a common reality of legal systems for as long as legal history has been
recorded); Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMB. L.J. 313,
315 (1978) (comparing laws to ideas, which will inevitably develop over time as
they are transplanted into different societies); see also William Ewald,
Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP.
L. 489, 491 (1995) (arguing in favor of Watson’s theory of legal transplantation
and noting that critics of his theory tend to misunderstand the structure of his
argument).
28. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163,
189 (2003) (arguing that the process of lawmaking, rather than the substantive
content of the laws transplanted, determines whether the laws adopted by a
particular society will be effective).
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professionals seeking to solve problems authoritatively by drawing
on the prestige of the foreign model; and the strategic adaptation by
national governments to the legal rules advocated by international
economic institutions in an effort to qualify for international loans,
attract foreign capital, and participate in the global marketplace.29
The new historical research contributes to the transplant literature
by documenting the phenomenon in the relatively novel domain of
supranational law and by shedding some light on the causal question
with evidence on the incentives and actors that prompted the transfer
of elements of domestic law into supranational law. As suggested by
the examples above, most of the research on transplants has
examined the horizontal transfer of rules and models between
national legal systems. To the extent that the literature considers the
impact of international law, it has focused on the downwards transfer
of law into national systems as a consequence of international
agreements or other forms of international pressure and the extent to
which reception has been successful or unsuccessful. Comparative
law has generally neglected to analyze the upward transfer of
domestic rules and models into the legal frameworks of regional and
international systems of governance. The new historical research
breaks ground by focusing on upward transplants and by
demonstrating the importance of domestic legal rules in inspiring the
institutional framework of the emerging supranational legal system
of European governance. Moreover, with the globalization of law
and politics, this form of transplantation can be expected to become
increasingly common, and therefore historical research on the
European case can be expected to have relevance for tracing the
genesis of the numerous systems of international courts and
lawmaking that have come afterwards.
Turning to the reasons for supranational transplants, perhaps not
surprisingly given the different context, none of the three pathways
identified in the comparative law literature appears to have been at
work. Foreign domination and international economic institutions
obviously have no explanatory purchase on the European experience.
At first blush, an explanation that draws on legal problem-solving
29. See Graziadei, supra note 25, at 456−61 (noting that discussing these
factors is useful for comparative law to understand the uniformity of legal
practices).
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based on the prestige of certain foreign models and insulated from
political pressure appears more promising. Yet at least the historical
account of what motivated the design of the Court of Justice in the
founding treaties, on which the archival records are relatively
complete, does not support this explanation. Rather, it suggests that
domestic legal rules served as a convenient toolbox from which
supranational institutional designers could opportunistically pick and
choose, depending on their political or ideological aims, without
regard for the opinion of the legal community, domestic or
otherwise, as to the prestige and authority of those transplanted rules.
Anne Boerger-de Smedt has thoroughly analyzed the historical
background of the key provisions of the Court of Justice in the
founding treaties.30 In many respects, the Court of Justice mimics the
principal French administrative court, the Council of State. Without
knowing the history, one might speculate that once the drafters
decided to create a supranational administration, they also felt the
necessity of guaranteeing some form of judicial review, as existed in
all the member states, at which point the legal experts tasked with
drafting the specific treaty provisions copied the prestigious French
model, which not only had a long and distinguished pedigree but also
had been the object of earlier transplants in most of the other member
states (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). One might
also expect that the French delegation, given its origins, was the most
convinced of the authority and prestige of the French model.
However, perhaps because the legal experts responsible for drafting
were under a tight leash from their political principals, this logic did
not drive the negotiations.
As the historical evidence reviewed by Boerger-de Smedt reveals,
the French delegation was the main opponent of judicial review,
including many features of the French model. The French delegation
initially opposed establishing any permanent court, for fear that fullfledged judicial review would undermine the powers and
prerogatives of the High Authority.31 Instead, the German and
30. See generally Boerger-de Smedt, La Cour de Justice, supra note 20;
Boerger-de Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 20.
31. Boerger-de Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 20, at 345−47
(explaining that Lagrange was appointed to make the Court resemble a “simple
[French] administrative court” and that other countries strongly opposed
Lagrange’s plans “because Lagrange’s proposals ignored previous compromises
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Benelux delegations were the main proponents of a permanent court,
the German delegation because of its federalist inclinations and the
Benelux delegation because it sought to protect state sovereignty and
national interests against an overly powerful High Authority.
Moreover, even after the French model emerged as the compromise
position, the delegations demonstrated a willingness to tinker with
that model in line with their political preferences without much
regard for the prestige of the French system. Most extraordinarily
from a transplant perspective, the French delegation would have
transposed only three out of the four heads of review that were
routinely applied by their Council of State (error of form, misuse of
power, and incompetence, but not violation of the law) in an attempt
to preserve the High Authority’s administrative discretion and limit
the powers of the Court of Justice.32 It was only on the prodding of
the federalist German delegation, which sought to establish a
supranational rule-of-law system, that the Court was also given the
power to review administrative acts for violations of the law.
Later, in the Treaty of Rome, when the institutional framework of
the Court of Justice was subject to renegotiation in light of the
experience of the European Coal and Steel Community, the national
legal experts on the drafting committee were again motivated by the
political preferences of their governments. Because individual
litigation was perceived as unduly interfering with the activities of
the High Authority, the standing rule was narrowed to bar individual
challenges to generally applicable regulations, representing another
departure from the French model.33 Moreover, on those issues on
which the legal experts were allowed some leeway by their political
principals, it appears that they were driven by a combination of
federalist ideology and what was thought to be politically feasible
rather than the prestige and authority of the national transplant. The
prime example of this was the preliminary reference system. The
and weakened the judicial protection”).
32. For a classic explanation of the French system of review for “excess of
power” that existed at the time and the four principal heads of review covered by
“excess of power,” see MAURICE HAURIOU, PRÉCIS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF ET
DE DROIT PUBLIC 439 (6th ed. 1907).
33. See also Michel Fromont, L’influence du Droit Francais et du Droit
Allemand Sur Les Conditions de Recevabilité du Recours en Annulation Devant la
Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, 2 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT EUROPÉEN 47, 61−64 (1966).
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drafters copied the Italian system of lower-court referrals of
constitutional questions to the Constitutional Court not because of
any recognized superiority of the foreign model—the Italian
Constitutional Court had just barely come into existence—but
because it furthered the federalist ideology of certain legal experts on
the drafting committee.
In sum, the legal history of the treaties suggests that national law
served as a source of inspiration for European law more because of
the limits of human imagination and the fact that national law
presented a readily available set of options, rather than because the
drafters held it in particularly high regard. The logic of convenience,
as opposed to prestige and authority, is underscored by the
willingness of the French delegation in the first instance to do
without an administrative court entirely and, in the second instance,
to omit some of the most important features of the French model. It
may well be that the explanation for supranational transplants in the
case law of the European Court of Justice, with legal principles such
as fundamental rights, is different and is driven less by political
expedience and more by the merits of the transplant in the eyes of the
legal community. In contrast with treaty negotiations, which
represent moments of high politics, the activity of courts is generally
less politically salient and, by virtue of the principle of judicial
independence, courts enjoy greater insulation than expert committees
from politicians. Transplants in judge-made law, therefore, might
very well adhere more closely to the authority explanation in the
general transplant literature since judicial decisionmaking is likely to
be driven more by standards internal to the law and the legal
profession. The question of what motivates transplants in
supranational courts remains a promising avenue for future research.

III. EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ORDER
Moving from past to present, Morten Rasmussen and Bill Davies
have suggested that the recent historical research has implications for
how the European legal order should be conceptualized today.34
Although they are careful not to overstate their case, they suggest
34. See Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, Towards a New History of European
Law, 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. 305, 308−09 (2012); see also Rasmussen, supra note 4.
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that since the rise of a constitutional practice was more contested and
contingent than originally believed, the foundations of the current
legal order are insecure and the constitutional characterization,
namely that it approximates a federal legal system, overblown. There
is no doubt that legal historians have dispensed with the aura of
inevitability that pervades much of the early legal scholarship and
neo-functionalist theories of legal integration in political science.35
By exposing how divided the Court was initially, how the
constitutional turn depended on the strategic and concerted
mobilization of a variety of legal and political actors, and how
national elites opposed the supremacy of European law in the 1960s
and the 1970s, historical research has demonstrated that
constitutionalism was only one of many possible frames for
European law and that the principal competing frame—public
international law—was equally possible.
Whether today, however, the member states have accepted or
rejected the constitutional revolution is another question. After all,
the constitutions of many nation states were heavily contested at the
time of their adoption and for decades thereafter, and nevertheless
today their law is considered constitutional in the sense that it is
recognized as binding and authoritative and is routinely applied by
courts.36 Although, as Rasmussen says, historical research has
demonstrated that the constitutional revolution had a very limited
impact on the member states in the 1960s and the 1970s, it does not
indicate whether this is still true today. To assess this claim,
therefore, I look outside of the history literature to explore some of
the recent challenges to the constitutional paradigm and to consider
the evidence that exists on the relative merits of the constitutional
paradigm over the principal alternative, namely public international
law.
To begin the discussion, it is fitting to repeat what is meant by
constitutionalization in the literature on European integration. The
term has not been used to claim that there is a foundational
document, similar to the U.S. Constitution or the French
Constitution, in which a European people has recognized that it
35. See Rasmussen, supra note 4.
36. One example is the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic. See RENÉ
RÉMOND, LE RETOUR DE DE GAULLE (1958).
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constitutes a single, self-governing community and has set down the
rules for the collective governance of their community. Rather,
constitutionalization refers to the system that has emerged for the
application and enforcement of European law. The claim is that this
system has come to resemble more closely a federal legal order than
one established under public international law by a treaty among
sovereign states because the rules generated by the system do not
simply bind nations in their dealings with one another but take effect
within their legal systems: national courts routinely apply European
law and, in the event of conflicts with national law, give precedence
to European law, and disputes are regularly and authoritatively
settled in the last instance by the European Court of Justice.
Constitutionalization includes both a doctrinal and empirical
component. The Court of Justice has announced a number of legal
doctrines that give rise to the duty to apply European law and submit
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. As Rasmussen explains,
the most prominent ones are direct effect and supremacy, but they
also include the law on the preliminary reference system and the
obligation of national courts to refer questions to the Court of Justice,
rights of access to national courts to litigate European law, and the
remedies to be awarded by national courts should a violation of
European law be found.37 Empirically, constitutionalization asserts
that practice followed doctrine and that national legal actors,
principally courts, have come to routinely apply European law and
recognize the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
There have been two types of challenges to the
constitutionalization claim: one is focused on the theoretical
doctrinal architecture and the other on the legal practice. Over the
past decade, a number of legal scholars have challenged the
theoretical vision of the European constitutional order as a
hierarchical system in which European law ranks above the law of
the member states, i.e. direct effect and supremacy, and the Court of
Justice is supreme and has the final word on any conflicts between
national and European law, i.e. the preliminary reference system.38
37. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS (5th ed. 2011).
38. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism:
Europe Meets the World, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 150,
202 (J.HH. Weiler & Grainne de Burca eds., 2012) (preferring primacy to
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Constitutional pluralism, as this line of scholarship is generally
known, posits a European constitutional order of multiple competing
claims to final authority, between national constitutions and the
founding treaties and between the European Court of Justice and
national constitutional courts, and seeks to develop a set of
normatively desirable legal principles and standards of reasoning that
can legitimately be used by courts to manage and reconcile such
conflicts. The empirical trigger for most of this literature is the
Maastricht Judgment of 1992, in which the German Constitutional
Court ruled that it, not the European Court of Justice, bore final
responsibility for policing the boundaries between supranational and
national competences and keeping the European Union within the
limits of the powers conferred in founding treaties.39 This case,
similar to the earlier German resistance based on fundamental rights
narrated by Bill Davies, has given rise to the very real possibility of
constitutional conflicts between different hierarchies of norms and
between national courts and the European Court of Justice.
Constitutional pluralism takes on the challenge of developing a
theory of constitutional law that can accommodate this system of
competing legal authority, which flies in the face of conventional
theories of law and hierarchy, and seeks to devise a principled
normative framework capable of resolving the conflicts inherent in a
system that lacks what legal positivists would call a single rule of
supremacy, as it would allow legal perspectives from outside the European Union);
see also Miguel Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 67, 68
(Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek eds., 2012) (arguing that constitutional pluralism is
better equipped to solve conflicts of authority than is the doctrine of supremacy);
Matthias Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority, in CONSTITUTIONAL
PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 39, 39 (Matej Avbelj & Jan
Komárek eds., 2012) (“It is widely recognized that European constitutional
practice has a pluralist structure. The legal orders of Member States are not
hierarchically integrated into the European legal orders. Instead, from the point of
view of Member States’ highest courts, the status of European Union law is a
matter to be determined with reference to national constitutional norms.”); Neil
Walker, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context, in CONSTITUTIONAL
PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 17, 17−19 (Matej Avbelj & Jan
Komark eds., 2012) (explaining the impetus behind the rise of the pluralism
argument to explain the transnational nature of law but to maintain the idea of
distinct constitutional singularities).
39. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct.
12, 1993, 69(2) C.M.L.R. 57 (Ger.).
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recognition and a single rule of adjudication.40
Although the possibility of a legal system without clear lines of
authority is theoretically intriguing and represents one of the most
vibrant areas of contemporary legal scholarship, it should be stressed
that neither legal pluralists nor the national constitutional law from
which they draw their inspiration reject all or indeed most of the
features of the doctrinal architecture that has been progressively
erected by the Court of Justice over the years. To give but one
example, supremacy, direct effect, and the duty to refer interpretive
questions to the Court of Justice are accepted in all cases in German
constitutional law except for those instances in which there is a
strong argument that there has been a violation of the Basic Law.41
Pursuant to these principles, in the early 1980s, the German
Constitutional Court scolded the highest German tax court for failing
to give direct effect to a European Directive or, in the alternative, in
the face of doubts over direct effect, for failing to refer the
interpretive question to the European Court of Justice.42
In addition, what bothers constitutional pluralists is not the actual
existence of constitutional conflict but the possibility of such
conflicts between competing judicial and normative hierarchies and
the implications of this possibility for theories of law and what it
means to be a legal system. They do not take a position on whether
national courts, as a matter of practice, routinely apply European law
and heed the judgments of the Court of Justice. In fact, part of the
fascination of the subject is that the European legal system can
function, and conflicts can be avoided, without a definitive hierarchy
of sources and institutions. Put somewhat differently, as the label of
constitutional pluralism suggests, this line of scholarship generally
takes the view that the European legal order is thicker than ordinary
international law and therefore merits the designation of
40. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed., 1994)
(describing rules of recognition as rules necessary to understand primary rules, and
rules of adjudication as rules necessary for understanding if a rule has been
breached and how to prescribe an enforceable remedy).
41. Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May
29, 1974, INTERNATIONALE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange I), 37 BVerfGE 271
(Ger.).
42. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr.
8, 1987, 75 BVerGE 223 (Ger.). This history is recounted in GEORGE BERMANN ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 304−05 (2d ed. 2002).
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“constitutional” but that the doctrinal architecture established by the
Court of Justice is an incomplete and, in some respects, misleading
account of how the legal system operates.
Indeed, looking at the actual practice of constitutional courts, the
pluralist threat appears quite remote, as outright conflict with the
European Court of Justice has been systematically averted. Although
a number of constitutional courts have called into question the
hierarchical nature of the European legal system, in the interest of
brevity, this discussion will focus exclusively on the German case.
Even though the German Constitutional Court signaled its opposition
to the Court of Justice as far back as 1974, with the Solange
judgment, it has never actually ruled a European measure to be in
breach of the German Basic Law.43 In some cases, it has avoided
directly challenging the authority of European law by deliberately
ruling on the legality of national implementing measures rather than
the European legislation pursuant to which the implementing
measure enacted. For instance, in a case challenging the EU Data
Retention Directive, which required that telecommunications data be
retained for law enforcement purposes, the Constitutional Court
found that the German implementing law, not the Directive,
breached the German right to informational self-determination by
mandating an excessively long retention period and by failing to
narrowly delineate the circumstances under which the police would
have access to the data.44
In other cases, the Constitutional Court has upheld German
ratification of European treaties, and therefore has allowed European
cooperation to go forward, but has imposed conditions on how
European law is to be interpreted in order to satisfy German
constitutional requirements. For example, the Court recently was
faced with a challenge to German ratification of the European
Stability Mechanism Treaty, which established a permanent bailout
fund to assist indebted Euro countries.45 The Court rejected the
43. Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May
29, 1974, INTERNATIONALE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT (Solange I), 37 BVerfGE 271
(Ger.).
44. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 2
Mar. 2010, 121 BVerfGE 1 (Ger.).
45. BVerfG, Extracts from the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of
12 September 2012, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (Ger.), available at
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challenge but found that democratic rights and procedures
guaranteed under the German Basic Law were implicated, and
therefore it set down a number of conditions for the operation of the
European Stability Mechanism, including a prohibition on borrowing
directly from the European Central Bank.46 Thus we see that the
Constitutional Court has sought to shape European law without
seeking to displace it, giving effect to European legal commitments
at the same time as it vindicates German constitutional principles.
A second type of challenge to the constitutional paradigm points to
the disconnect between the legal theory of direct effect, supremacy,
and all the other pieces of the federalist legal architecture and the
empirical realities of litigation and legal practice in the member
states. Looking past constitutional courts to the mass of adjudication
that occurs at the lower levels of the judiciary, Lisa Conant has
documented the variable and patchy enforcement of European legal
rules, together with a reluctance to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice through the preliminary reference procedure.47
However, even though Conant points to significant shortcomings of
the legal system, other evidence is more promising for the
constitutional paradigm. The number of preliminary references
reaching the Court of Justice has steadily increased over the years.
Indeed, there has been talk of reforming the Court’s procedure to
reduce the burden of the preliminary reference caseload, something
that was unthinkable in the early decades of legal integration, when
the Court did everything possible to encourage recalcitrant national
courts to submit to its jurisdiction.48 Moreover, it is fairly clear that
knowledge of European law is more diffuse than it was even two
decades ago and that the legal establishment in most places is
reasonably conversant with European law. This stands in marked
contrast with the 1960s and 1970s, when, as the new historical
research has shown, legal elites familiar with and supportive of

http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20120912_2bvr139012en.
html.
46. Id. at 149−51.
47. LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED 15, 42 (2002).
48. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2010-1, H.L. 128 ¶¶ 97−117 (U.K.) (encouraging
national courts to adopt the policy but rejecting the idea of making the practice
compulsory).
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European integration were an embattled minority.49
The transmission of European law in the member states today
takes many forms. While in the 1980s, the law of the then-European
Communities was still an optional part of the university curriculum,
today it is mandatory in most places.50 The same is true of the
specialized training for judges that in many countries follows
university studies.51 In each of the member states, there exists an
ample array of textbooks, treatises, legal journals, and other
professional publications that lay bare the field and track the most
recent developments in European law. The judgments of the
European Court of Justice are published and analyzed in a number of
scholarly venues, and in those legal traditions in which codes and
scholarly commentary are the principal source of law, there exist
competing compilations of the European treaties, commented article
by article by leading scholars.52 The transnational networks of
national lawyers and academics devoted to propagating and shaping
European law have also proliferated and have become increasingly
specialized, with different groups devoted to administrative
procedure,53 criminal justice,54 immigration law,55 and other topics. In
49. See, e.g., Davies & Rasmussen, supra note 34, at 308−09, 313 (describing
how pro-integration jurists faced serious resistance from Gaullist France).
50. See, e.g., Herbert Hausmaninger, Austrian Legal Education, 45 S. TEX. L
REV. 387, 393 (2002) (placing law of the European Union in the third semester of
Austrian legal education); see also Marie-Luce Paris & Lawrence Donnelly, Legal
Education in Ireland: A Paradigm Shift to the Practical?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1067,
1074 (2010) (requiring students to take, among other courses, Law of the European
Union for barristers to hold a degree in Irish law); Axel C. Filges, Remarks at the
Opening of the Symposium Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the German Law
Journal – German Federal Bar (BRAK), 10 GERMAN L.J. 1305, 1305 (2009)
(stating that European law is mandatory in German legal education because
European law “is nowadays almost seen as national law”).
51. See, e.g., Programme Pédagogique de la Promo 2012, ECOLE NATIONALE
DE LA MAGISTRATURE, 46 available at http://www.enm-justice.fr/formationinitiale/accueil.php.
52. See, e.g., Commentaire article par article des Traités UE et CE sous la
direction de Philippe Léger (2000).
53. See, e.g., RESEARCH NETWORK ON EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW [RENEUAL],
http://www.reneual.eu (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (seeking to simplify and create
further transparency for EU administrative law).
54. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW ACADEMIC NETWORK [ECLAN],
http://www.eclan.eu (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (collecting research on EU
criminal law).
55. See, e.g., The Academic Network for Legal Studies on Immigration and

1334

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[28:5

sum, there can be no doubt that the judges, civil servants, lawyers,
and scholars who write ministerial circulars, law review articles,
briefs, and judicial opinions have a better grasp of European law and
therefore are more likely than their predecessors to invoke the rights
and duties of European law.
In conclusion, once the constitutional critique is carefully analyzed
and the countervailing evidence considered, the European
constitutional order appears to be on fairly solid ground. The
constitutional paradigm might not perfectly capture the theory and
practice of European law, but neither does the main alternative
paradigm of international law. The question is not whether the
European legal system mimics a federal legal order but whether it
approximates more closely a domestic or international legal system.
Is the role of European law in domestic courts more analogous to,
say, the application of articles of the Civil Code and the related
jurisprudence or to the application of the provisions of the WTO’s
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and to national enforcement
of judgments of the International Court of Justice? On the whole, it
appears to come closer to the former model.

IV. CONCLUSION
Recent historical research on the origins of the European
constitutional order has afforded numerous invaluable insights into
the roots of what is the most highly developed supranational legal
system in existence today. In particular, two achievements of the
recent historiography stand out, both for their contribution to the
theory of European legal integration and to the discipline of
comparative law more generally speaking. First, recent historical
research has demonstrated the importance of executive branch
lawyers, legal academics, and the organized bar in creating the
normative discourse of European law. Second, the new legal history
of the treaties and the case law underscores the importance of
national law as a crucial source of inspiration for European law.
These two insights have significantly advanced our understanding of
how the European legal system actually came into being, dispelling
Asylum in Europe (Odysseus), INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN STUDIES, http://www.ieeulb.eu/sitepages/view/58 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013) (compiling expertise on EU
immigration and asylum law).
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long-standing functionalist myths and hindsight-based narratives,
and can inform the debates in the field of comparative law.
At the same time, stressing that the origins of important aspects of
the constitutionalization of Europe were much more contested and
contingent than originally believed does not in itself provide
sufficient grounds for inferring that the current status of the
European constitutional legal order is uncertain. Theoretically, there
do not appear to be grounds for this claim: a large body of research
on path dependence in economics,56 sociology,57 and political
science58 in the past quarter century has shown that many resilient
institutional systems have been put on self-reinforcing paths by
contingent events and highly contested beginnings. Although in
principle any institutional arrangement is open to reversal, what this
large literature shows is that institutional vulnerability does not
depend on the degree of contestation at the origins. In the case of the
European Union, the evidence is mixed, and the jury is out, but the
supporters of a constitutionalist interpretation are probably closer to
capturing the real nature of the European legal order than those who
consider it just another version of international law.

56. See, e.g., Paul David, Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for
“Historical Economics” (June 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with All
Souls Coll., Oxford Univ. & Stanford Univ.).
57. See, e.g., Jack A. Goldstone, Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path
Dependence, and Explanation in Historical Sociology, 104 AM. J. SOC. 829,
841−43 (1998).
58. See, e.g., Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the
Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 263−66 (2000).

